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DEVELOPING FEDERAL LABOR LAW OF
WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS*
Raymond Goetzt
For some twenty years, welfare and pension plans have been encompassed within the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"' that describes the scope of mandatory bargaining under sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), and 8(d) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act (LMRA).2 The regular inclusion of these plans as subjects of collective bargaining has been a major factor in their
tremendous growth. Recently, efforts have been made to extend other
principles of federal labor law to the negotiation and administration of
these plans. This article will explore four areas in which federal
labor law of welfare and pension plans seems to be developing: (1)
the union duty of fair representation with respect to these plans; (2)
the relationship of trustees of jointly-administered plans under section
- 302(c)(5) of the Act to collective bargaining; (3) the federal court juris,diction over trust administration under section 302(e) of the Act; 4 and
(4) the interplay of state and federal law in enforcement of various
types of welfare and pension agreements.
0 This is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at. the Sixteenth
Annual Institute on Labor Law of the Southwestern Legal Foundation at Dallas, Texas,
on October 30, 1969. Portions of that paper are reprinted here with the permission of
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. (New York), which has published and copyrighted the
Proceedings of the Institute as LAoa LAW D=vLopmsxrs 1970.

t Professor of Law, University of Kansas. J.D. 1950, M.B.A. 1963, University of
Chicago.
I Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1964). See W.W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162, enforced, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949);
Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949). The term "welfare plan" is used broadly herein to include all negotiated
plans providing group life insurance, hospital, medical, surgical, accident and sickness,
and similar benefits, insured or uninsured, under a single or multi-employer program.
The term "pension plan" is also used broadly to include all negotiated plans providing
retirement benefits, whether by insurance or by trust, of the single or multi-employer
type.
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1964). See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). For a detailed discussion of the scope and nature of the
bargaining obligation with respect to pension plans, see Goetz, Pension Plans and Labor
Law, 1967 U. ILL. LF. 738.
8 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1964).
4 Id. § 186(e).
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I
THE

UNION

DUTY

OF

FAnR

REPRESENTATION

A union certified or recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent

under federal law has a statutory obligation to serve the interests of
all members of the unit without hostility or discrimination, and to
exercise its discretion as bargaining agent in good faith.5 Breach of
this duty may provide the basis of a suit for damages in state or federal
courts or an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.6
An important new facet of the duty of fair representation concerns the negotiation of changes in welfare and pension benefits that
affect persons who have retired from the bargaining unit. This extension of the duty is a probable result of the NLRB decision in Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. 7 that an employer's duty to bargain includes an obligation to bargain about changes in welfare and retirement benefits for retirees. Although the Board was not faced with the fair representation
issue, it is implicit in the Board's determination that retirees from the
bargaining unit are still "employees" within the meaning of the Act. 8
The Board did not actually state that the union was "representing"
the retired "employees," but unless the Board intended to establish
the union as their representative under sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of
the Act,9 there was no apparent reason to have decided that retirees
are "employees."
If the union actually is the representative of retirees-at least for
purposes of bargaining about changes in their benefits-it would follow
that the duty of fair representation must apply. The original reasons
for implying this duty as a correlative of the union's statutory right
to act as exclusive bargaining representative 0 have equal force here.
Like a minority within the active unit, retirees are deprived by law
5 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 842
(1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffiman, 845 U.S. 830, 837 (1958); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1944).
6 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); United Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 868
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 837 (1967); Miranda Fuel Oil Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Although the duty
originated under the Railway Labor Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964), this article deals
only with the duty as it applies under the Labor-Management Relations Act.
7 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 71 L.R.R.M. 1438 (July 9, 1969).
8 Id. at 5, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1435. See id. at 23, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1442 (Zagoria, dissenting).
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1964).
10 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 830 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R,,
823 U.S. 192 (1944).
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of the opportunity to select a separate representative to protect their
interests. Thus, when retirees are represented by the union that is currently the bargaining agent for the unit from which they retired, they
must be represented fairly. If, after this extension of the statutory
bargaining duty, unions and employers are to determine adjustments
in retiree benefits, the affected retirees should be protected against
possible selfishness or caprice of the union majority."
Would this protection be available, however, if retirees were not
considered employees under the LMRA? This question would become
important should the court of appeals enforce the Board's Pittsburgh
Plate Glass bargaining order concerning retiree benefits without affirming the Board's questionable determination of employee status for
retirees. 12 Such a result could be reached on the basis of the Board's
alternate theory that retiree benefits are a mandatory bargaining subject under section 8(d) because those benefits vitally affect active employees and are therefore part of their "conditions of employment."' 13
If this alternate theory were adopted, there would be no basis for considering the union to be the exclusive "representative" of retirees, and,
accordingly, no basis for implying a correlative duty of fair representation.
It seems doubtful, however, that this logical gap would give unions
uncontrolled discretion over retiree benefits. The Supreme Court in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard14 -a case involving
racial discrimination-has already extended the union's duty of fairness to persons outside the bargaining unit. The Court there stated
that bargaining agents who enjoy the advantages of federal labor
laws "must execute their trust without lawless invasions of the rights
of other workers."' 15 This reasoning does not confine a union's duty
of fair representation to minorities deprived of separate representation
by a statutory monopoly grant. In fact, the complainants in Howard
had their own bargaining agent in a separate unit, but they would have
been ousted from their jobs by the agreement negotiated by the discriminating union. Unless Howard is limited to instances of racial
discrimination-which seems unlikely-its guiding principle would
11 This rationale for judicial supervision of bargaining was adopted in Cox, The
Duty of Fair Representation,2 VIL. L. Rxv. 151, 167 (1957).
12 The case is now pending before the Sixth Circuit on petition for review. Appeal
docketed, No. 19875, 6th Cir., Sept. 23, 1969.
13 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at

13, 71 L.R.R.M. 1433, 1438 (July 9, 1969).
14 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
165Id. at 774.
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seem to be that a union occupies a position of trust with respect to all
persons whose rights or economic benefits may be directly affected by
agreements reached in the course of its functioning as bargaining
agent. 16
This principle could apply to benefits of retirees. Whether or not
the bargaining agent for the active unit is viewed as their statutory
representative, a federal statute has now been interpreted as granting
that agent the right to bargain with the employer about retiree benefits.
Since the economic security and welfare of retirees is within the union's
control, the union is placed in a position of trust with respect to their
benefits. Although it is difficult to imagine union discrimination against
retirees as blatant as that in Howard, retiree dependence on the negotiation of benefits entrusted to unions by Pittsburgh Plate Glass might
well call for protection against any possibility of discrimination.
Assuming that a duty of fair representation is owed to retirees,
what does it entail? The duty has never required identical treatment
of all. As the Supreme Court noted in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman:17
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which
the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees ....

A wide range of reasonableness

must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving
the unit it represents. 18
Thus, unions have considerable latitude in apportioning benefits between active and retired employees in collective bargaining. As long
as a union does not arbitrarily ignore or subvert the needs of retirees,
there should be no breach of the duty to represent them fairly.
This generalization does not provide union representatives a useful standard for resolving the competing demands of the bargaining
process. How can a union be certain that its pragmatic resolution of
these conflicts under pressure will not later be viewed as arbitrary or.
discriminatory by a court? This problem is not unique to welfare and
pension bargaining, but it may be particularly acute there because
benefits for retirees usually are obtainable only at the expense of
16 See Summers, collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement
-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.j. 421, 432 (1963). But cf.
Cox, supra note 11, at 158 (suggesting that Howard be limited to its peculiar facts).
17 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
18 Id. at 338. In Humphrey v. Moore, 375 US. 335 (1964), the Court stated:
[W]e are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agent's duty of
fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in supporting the position of ond group of employees against that of another.
Id. at 349.
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active employees, and vice versa. Bargaining representatives are faced
with some difficult practical questions: Must the union negotiate increased benefits for retirees every time it negotiates benefits for active
employees, or at least each time it negotiates improved welfare and
pension benefits for active employees? How may a union justify differences in treatment of the two groups? Must the union seek out the
wishes of retirees before bargaining on pensions? Unfortunately, the
vague concept of good faith provides no pat answers.
A union probably would not be justified in devoting an entire
settlement effort to securing economic benefits for active employees
simply to satisfy the dictates of political pressure within the union.
Based on fair representation cases in other contexts, it seems likely that
if a choice of demands were based on political expediency alone a
breach of the duty of fair representation could be found.19 On the other
hand, the union probably would not have to solicit views of retirees as
20
long as they were given a reasonable oppbrtunity to be heard.
The standard of good faith would also govern the disposition of
claims of retirees under existing welfare or pension agreements. Frequently such agreements call for union participation in special procedures for resolving disputed benefit claims. 21 The duty of fair representation owed to retirees doubtless would include the administration of existing agreements and would require that the union stay
within the bounds set forth in Vaca v. Sipes22 for handling grievances
of active employees. Even though a benefit claim might ultimately turn
out to be meritorious, settlement by the union short of arbitration
would not be a breach of the union's duty as long as its decision was
made in good faith and in a reasonable manner.
Questions concerning the duty of fair representation also arise in
the negotiation of welfare and pension benefits for active employees.
Compulsory retirement, for example, may work to the disadvantage of
19 Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (discrimination in the assignment of overtime); Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847,
850 (2d Cir. 1961) (discrimination in transfer of place of employment); Blumrosen, The
Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the
Worker-Union Relationship,61 MicH. L. REv. 1435, 1482 (1963).
20 See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944); McMullans v. Kansas, 0.
& G. Ry., 229 F.2d 50, 56 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 851 U.S. 918 (1956); Goodin v. Clinchfield R.R., 125 F. Supp. 441, 452 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956).
21 See, e.g., Pension Agreement Between United States Steel Corporation and United
43,738 (1967); Pension Agreement
Steelworkers of America, CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE
43,517Between General Motors Corporation and the UAW, CCH PENSION PLAN GUmE
39 (1968).
22 386 US. 171, 191-94 (1967).
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older employees as capable of working as younger employees whose
superior numbers might determine the union's bargaining position on
this issue. Several courts have held, however, that agreement to such a
provision does not breach a union's duty of fair representation because
it does not show hostile discrimination.23 Since all employees who remain long enough will be similarly affected by the provision, it is not
considered discriminatory.
Agreements providing special early retirement privileges or lesser
insurance benefits for women are incapable of uniform application and
might be considered unfair discrimination based on sex. Whatever
their status under other federal laws, however, such agreements probably do not violate the duty of fair representation if the difference in
treatment is designed to take into account economic needs of married
women.

24

Where a union agrees to eliminate jobs through "automation"
arrangements, negotiation of special welfare and retraining benefits for
those thrown out of work probably does not breach the duty of fair
representation. 25 Although employees remaining on the job may reap
the benefit of higher wages at the expense of those eliminated, such
agreements seem genuinely designed to meet competitive conditions
in the particular industry and to achieve the greatest good for the
greatest number. Any claim of hostile discrimination against the displaced minority should be overcome by the special benefits negotiated
by the union to ease the transition.
In negotiated arrangements for termination of pension plans in
connection with plant shutdowns, a superannuated minority is sometimes given favorable treatment at the expense of the majority. Questions about the duty of fair representation arise when funds accumulated under an insurance contract or trust are inadequate to provide
all accrued benefits. In one such case, the union and the company
agreed to amend the pension plan so that the portion of the fund
attributable to a division being closed would be used entirely to provide
benefits for employees over age sixty with at least fifteen years of ser23 Roberts v. Lehigh & N.E. Ry., 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963); McMullans v. Kansas,
0. & G. Ry., 229 F.2d 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 918 (1956). See Goodin v.
Clinchfield R.R., 125 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956).
24 Cf. Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 128, 84 N.W.2d 523, 533 (1957).
25 Examples of such arrangements are the West Coast Longshoremen's "containerization" settlement referred to in an address by William E. Simkin, entitled "Preventive
Mediation Revisited," in BNA LAu. REL. YEARBooK 195-97 (1966), and the packinghouse
automation program discussed in Report of the Armour Automation Committee, 55
L.R.R.M. 30 (1964).
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vice.26 Other employees below age sixty were to receive nothing, even
though some had served longer than those over sixty. In a suit by the
latter group against the union and the employer, the court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 27 Although arbitrary discrimination had been alleged, the court apparently did not consider
the preference of age over service the type of discrimination that would
violate the duty of fair representation. This seems in accord with Ford
Motor Co.,2 8 which mentioned age as a permissible variable. While
the settlement in question deprived many employees of deferred compensation paid into the pension fund, it appeared to be a good faith
effort by the union and the employer to distribute a limited fund
among those employees approaching normal retirement age who would
consequently have the most difficulty finding work.
Good faith alone may not be sufficient to insulate a union from
liability to employees for a termination settlement that wipes out vested
rights to benefits. 2 9 An agreement to modify such rights might be the

kind of arbitrary union action that breaches the duty of fair representation.
However, it is often difficult to determine whether or not particular employee benefits actually are vested. 30 Most collectively-bargained welfare and pension agreements have a specified term after
which they may be renegotiated or terminated. This raises the question whether any rights to welfare or pension benefits can properly be
considered immutable in the absence of very clear language in the
agreement.
The problem is illustrated by the recent case of Hauserv. Farwell,
Ozmun, Kirk & Co.31 There, a deposit administration insurance contract implementing the pension plan expressly provided that, in the
event of termination of employer contributions, the "deposit fund"
would be used to provide annuities for employees in a stated order of
precedence, and that such annuities would be "fully vested" in each
participant. In contemplation of an announced plant shutdown that
would have resulted in termination of the pension plan, the union and
26 Smith v. DCA Food Indus., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D. Md. 1967).
27 Smith v. DCA Food Indus., Inc., Civil No. 18237 (D. Md. April 3, 1968).

28 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 US. 330 (1953).
29 By definition, a vested right is one that is legally immutable. 3A A. CoRBIN, CONTRAcrs § 742, at 453 (1960).
30 Professor Corbin has pointed out that "[p]erhaps nobody knows exactly what is
meant by the term 'vested interest'--a term that is so often rolled ponderously off the
tongue as a substitute for a major premise, in order to reach a desired conclusion." Id.
81 299 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn. 1969).
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the employer agreed to amend the stated order of precedence so that the
entire fund could be used to provide meaningful annuities for three
employees between ages sixty-two and sixty-five. Without this amendment, the fund would have been used to provide deferred annuities
averaging $2.70 per month (less than $5.00 per month in every case)
for all thirty-seven employees below age sixty-five. As part of the settlement, the company agreed to contribute an additional $1,771 toward
annuities- for the three employees.
Since the contract failed to stipulate when a termination of employer contributions would trigger the vesting provision, and since the
amendment was made two weeks before the plant shutdown, the union
could reasonably assume it still had the power to alter the order of precedence. Although the district court conceded that both the union and
the company had acted in good faith, it found that the rights of all
employees to annuities under the original termination provision had
become vested. The court, therefore, held the union and company
jointly liable for the deferred annuities to which employees under age
sixty-two should have been entitled. Liability was not based on the
union's duty of fair representation, however. The court relied on Elgin,
Joliet & Eastern Railway v. Burley32 for the proposition that a union
cannot bargain away vested rights of its members, and concluded that
the union and the company were liable as "converters" of the fund.
It must be conceded that the concept of "vested rights" necessarily
implies that a union has no authority to bargain away such rights. It
should be emphasized, however, that vesting of benefits cannot be presumed under an agreement that by its terms is subject to renegotiation
and termination. The real question is whether the agreement does
make it clear that certain benefits are beyond the power of the union
and the employer to modify.83
Even when employee rights to benefits under a pension plan are
clearly vested, it does not necessarily follow that because a negotiated
modification may be ineffective the union must incur joint liability
with the employer for conversion of the fund. A more logical result
would be reinstatement of the employer's original obligation. If the
union exercised its statutory bargaining rights in good faith, it should
not be penalized.
32 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing,327 U.S. 661 (1946).
33 For a statement that unions do have the power to adversely affect pension benefits
of employees who have met the eligibility requirements, but have not retired, see Note,
Contractual Aspects of Pension Plan Modification, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 251, 268 (1956).
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The principles applied in Vaca v. Sipes8 4 seem broad enough to
relieve the union from liability in cases of this kind. There, the union
had undermined a disabled employee's claim to reinstatement through
failure to pursue his grievance to arbitration. The claim was later
found to be meritorious by a state court. The Supreme Court, however,
held that the union was not liable to the employee for damages because there was no showing that it had acted arbitrarily or in bad faith.
Moreover, even if a breach of the duty of fair representation had been
shown, the union would not have been liable to the employee for
damages resulting from the employer's breach of contract; that liability
rests solely with the employer. In Vaca, of course, the union sought
to resolve a close question of contractual rights under a grievance
procedure designed for this purpose, whereas in Hauser the union
sought to change known rights it considered negotiable. Since the effect
on the employee in either case is to deprive him of legal rights he possessed under the contract, it is difficult to see why the union's liability
should be any greater in the latter case than in the former.
Reliance on the ancient tort of conversion in the Hausercase seems
inappropriate, but was perhaps due to a misunderstanding of the characteristics of the "fund" involved. A deposit fund under such a contract
is an undivided account comprising part of the general assets of the
insurance company. No individual has any right to a specified sum from
the fund; rather, annuities are purchased for employees when they
retire. The amount received by employees under the annuity contracts
is determined by longevity. 35 There are no indicia of ownership in the
fund that can be drawn on, sold, or transferred by employees. Thus, in
Hauser there was no element of the interference with tangible personal
property or documents normally associated with the tort of conver6
sion.3
Unions may be powerless to impair or extinguish "vested rights"
of employees in negotiating the disposition of a pension fund, but
there is no necessity to hold them liable to employees when such an
agreement is made in good faith.37 In such cases, there is no breach of
the duty of fair representation, nor any real conversion, and the employees still can recover from their employer.
34 386 US. 171 (1967). In this case the employees were trying to recover from the
employer, not the union.
85 J. HAMILTON & D. BRONSON, PENSIONS 149-52 (1958).

8 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAW or TORTS § 15, at 81-84 (3d ed. 1964).
87 See International Longshoremen v. Kuntz, 334 F.2d 165, 171 (9th Cir. 1964); cf.

Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 258, 91 N-E.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1949).
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The actions of union-appointed trustees under jointly-administered welfare and pension plans established under section 302(c) of the
LMRA may open another frontier of the duty of fair representation. 8
These negotiated plans-commonly found in industries such as construction and trucking where irregular employment and multi-employer bargaining are the rule-permit pooling of contributions by
numerous employers to provide benefits on a uniform basis for the
overall employee group. Whenever union representatives participate
in their administration, these funds must be structured in accordance
with section 302(c) of the LMRA.39 One of the statutory requirements
is that employees and employers be equally represented in the administration of the fund, which must be in the form of a trust. The employee representatives are normally union officials appointed as trustees
by the union.
A recent case, Nedd v. UMW,40 indicates that under certain circumstances a union might be liable for actions of union trustees that
would have constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation if
taken by the union directly in fulfilling its normal bargaining responsibility. There, the complaint alleged that the union and the trustees
had failed to collect some $10,000,000 in royalty payments for a welfare
fund from certain employers because of a secret decision to promote
the interests of active miners over retirees. Although the court assumed
that the union had no contractual obligation to enforce employer
payments to the fund and that the payment obligation was enforceable by the trustees, it held that this allegation, if proven, might
establish breach of the union's duty of fair representation.
This holding suggests that a union might also be liable for breach
of the duty of fair representation if its appointees to the board of
trustees caused the fund to be administered in a manner that discriminated unfairly against minorities. Thus, the duty might also extend
to cases where union trustees cause or permit the fund to be used
38 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1964).
89 For a detailed discussion of these statutory requirements, see Goetz, Employee

Benefit Trusts Under Section 302 of Labor Management Relations Act, 59 Nw. U.L. Ray.
719 (1965).
40 400 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1968). But see Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864, 865 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), stating that the union's duty of fair representation is not applicable to

trustees because as trustees they do not act as representatives of either the employers or
the union. This statement was based on United Marine Div. v. Essex Transp. Co., 216
F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1954), in which the court made a questionable interpretation of the
term "representative" that would have rendered § 302(c) a nullity. Cf. Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n, 248 F.2d 307, 315 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 924 (1958).
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for aggrandizement of the union or its officials to the detriment of
covered employees. 41 Although discrimination would be lacking, the
union would be executing its trust as statutory representative in a
manner adverse to the individuals it was supposed to represent fairly.
Such conduct might also be a breach by the trustees of their own trust,
but affected employees could have a more effective remedy against the
union for breach of the duty of fair representation because individual
trustees might be "judgment proof" or insulated from liability by
exculpatory clauses in the trust agreement.
Development of the law in this area will depend on whether
actions of union-appointed trustees are viewed as an integral part of
the union's function as exclusive bargaining representative.
II
TKE

RELATIONSHIP OF TRUSTEE CONDUCT OF JOINTLY-

ADMINISTERED FUNDS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Union and employer trustees of jointly-administered welfare and
pension plans under section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA42 undoubtedly

have the same fiduciary responsibility imposed on individual trustees
under the common law of trusts. 43 Their primary responsibility is to

administer the trust in accordance with its terms, solely in the interest
of the beneficiaries. 44 A new dimension may be added to this responsibility by the statutory provision that employer trustees are "represent-

ing" employers and union trustees are "representing" employees. 45
It may be significant that section 302(c)(5) does not speak of
trustees "appointed by" employers and employees. The requirement
of proviso (B) that "employees and employers [be] equally represented
41 For a flagrant example of this type of abuse, see Kroger Co. v. Blassie, 225 F. Supp.
300 (E.D. Mo. 1964), modified & remanded, 345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965).
42 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1964) states in relevant part:
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable . . . (5) with respect to money or other such thing of value paid to a trust fund established by
such representative . . . . Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust
for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the
benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital
care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or
illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the
foregoing ....
See note 39 supra.
43 Cohen v. Kralstein, 73 L.R.R.M. 2845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 3, 1970); cf. Booth v.
Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 755 (D.N.J. 1957).
4
4 RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 164 (1959).
45 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1964).
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in the administration of such fund" is followed immediately by provision for appointment of a neutral person to break deadlocks by
"the representatives of the employers and the representatives of [the]
'46
employees.
The importance of completely separate representation for employers and employees was emphasized in the recent case of Quad-City
Builders Ass'n v. Tri-City Bricklayers Union No. 7.47 The welfare
fund there was held to violate section 302 because one of the three
employer trustees was a union member, as was a majority of the
employer group empowered to appoint and remove employer trustees.
The court concluded that union domination of the fund was "a very
real possibility" and that inherent in such domination was the possibility of abuse that section 802 was designed to prevent.
Thus, the usual parties to collective bargaining-employers and
employees-must be separately represented when trustees of welfare
and pension funds confer. Furthermore, the subjects about which the
trustees confer are within the scope of mandatory collective bargaining
under the Act.48 The typical collective bargaining agreement pursuant
to which a fund is established provides simply that employer contributions shall be made at a specified rate to a trust already existing, or
to be established, for the purpose of providing either health and welfare
benefits or pension benefits. 4 9 The governing trust agreement separately
entered into by the parties to the collective bargaining agreement may
specify general categories of benefits, but it normally delegates to the
trustees broad discretion to determine specific benefit levels and
eligibility requirements, to modify the benefit plan, and to administer
the plan. 0
Exercise of this discretionary power may involve important questions of policy or judgment on which union and employer trustees
may well differ. This potential divergence of interests was the underlying reason for the statutory requirement of equal representation.
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 502 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D. Iowa 1969); cf. Tucker v. Shaw, 73 L.R.R.M. 2567 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 9, 1970).

See notes 1-2 supra.
49 See, e.g., Central States Area Over-The-Road Motor Freight Supplemental Agree59,944.38, .63, .64 (1967).
ment of Teamsters Union, CCH LAB. L. REP.
50 See, e.g., Agreement and Declaration of Trust, establishing the LAM LaborManagement Pension Fund art. VI, § 1 (May 1, 1960) (copies of which are available to
all contributing employers), which provides in part:
The Trustees shall have full authority to determine all questions of nature,
amount and duration of benefits to be provided, based on what it is estimated
the Fund can provide without undue depletion or excessive accumulation ....
48
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Employer representatives were intended to act as a check on the untrammeled discretion of the union. The possibility of adverse interests
leading to dispute is recognized by the statutory provision for breaking
deadlocks through appointment of an impartial umpire.
Despite the unusual setting, the deliberations of trustees of these
funds may be looked upon as an extension of the collective bargaining process within contractual and statutory limits. It must be recognized, of course, that trustees generally consider themselves aloof from
collective bargaining.51 Undoubtedly, the atmosphere in trustees' meetings is quite different from that of the bargaining table. Both sides
do have a common interest in the welfare of the employees. The
small number of reported decisions on petitions for appointment of an
impartial umpire would indicate that serious disputes are rare. 52 However, the absence of deadlocks could be deceptive. Since action on most
matters can be taken by a simple majority, factionalism among employer trustees may permit a unified group of union trustees to "pick
off" one employer trustee needed for action. 53 To the extent that this
is done, it further evidences a "quasi-bargaining" situation.
One result of viewing employer and union trustees of such funds
as collective bargaining representatives would be the possibility, discussed earlier, of including their actions within the union's duty of
fair representation. Logically, the trustees might also be subject to the
duty to bargain in good faith imposed on their principals, both employers and unions, by sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(2) of the Act.54 Thus,
in the event employer trustees flatly refused to consider a proposal
made by union trustees within the scope of mandatory bargaining and
their powers under the trust agreement-such as benefits for retireesthey might be guilty of a violation of section 8(a)(5). However, the
statutory procedure for breaking trustee deadlocks through arbitration
51 The Third Circuit has even taken the anomalous position that when they put on
their trustees' "hats," union and employer appointees no longer act as representatives of
the parties. United Marine Div. v. Essex Transp. Co., 216 F.2d 410 (3d Cir. 1954). This

contradicts both the wording of the statute and the realities of the situation.
52 Poston v. Caraker, 378 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1967); Mahoney v. Fisher, 277 F.2d 5
(2d Cir. 1960); Barrett v. Miller, 276 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1960); Bath v. Pixler, 283 F. Supp.
632 (D. Colo. 1968); Weinstein v. Bracco, 69 L.R.R.M. 2436 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Ware v.

Swan, 44 L.R.R.M. 2785 (S.D. Cal. 1959); In re Feldman, 165 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
53 See James, Manipulation of a Joint Pension Board for Power Purposes: The

Teamster Experience, N.Y.U. 20th ANNuAL CoNF. ON LAn. 381 (1968).
54 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(2) (1964). This analysis is supported by the parallel
phraseology of § 8(a)(5), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an "employer" to

refuse to bargain collectively with "the representatives of his employees," (id. § 158(a)(5))
and § 302(c)(5), which refers to union trustees as "the representatives of employees."

Id. I 186(c)(5).
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probably makes it unnecessary to extend the duty to bargain this far.
A more likely consequence of looking upon trustees' meetings as
an extension of collective bargaining would be a different approach
by federal courts to petitions under section 302 for appointment of an
impartial umpire to resolve deadlocks. The courts have not hesitated
to examine the applicable trust agreement to determine whether the
question on which the trustees are deadlocked is resolved by the governing documents. For example, one court denied appointment of an
impartial umpire to resolve a deadlock on self-insurance of welfare
benefits because an interpretation of the trust agreement permitting
this mode of benefit payment was "not fairly arguable."55 Another
court denied appointment of an impartial umpire to break an impasse
on the question of trustee compensation on the ground that the trust
agreement could not be interpreted to allow such compensation.5 6
If the Steelworker Trilogy57 rules concerning judicial determination
of arbitrability were applicable in this area, a different result would
be reached in such cases. These rules state that courts have no business
weighing the merits of the case or determining whether language in
the agreement will support the claim at issue; doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitrability. Thus, the court would be confined
to ascertaining whether the dispute on its face is governed by the
trust agreement.
In Weinstein v. Bracco,58 however, the court found these rules
governing arbitration under collective bargaining agreements inapplicable to arbitration of a deadlock between trustees of a fund.
Appointment of an impartial umpire to break a deadlock concerning a
method of appointing co-counsel to the trustees was denied on the
ground that the trustees had no power under the trust agreement to
adopt the proposed method. The court found the Trilogy rules inapplicable because "[t]here are no 'labor disputes' here nor possibility
of 'industrial strife.'-89

This view seems unrealistic. In cases of this kind, there clearly is
a dispute between employer and union representatives over a matter
intimately related to wages and working conditions. But for the delegation to the trustees, the dispute would normally be resolved through
55 Barrett v. Miller, 276 F.2d 429, 432-33 (2d Cir. 1960).
56 Poston v. Caraker, 378 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1967).
57 Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
58 69 L.R.R.M. 2436 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
59 Id. at 2438.
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more traditional bargaining channels. The possibility of strife is not
as remote as the court assumes. For example, if it could be demonstrated that self-insurance of benefits would result in benefit increases,
employees might well resort to economic pressure against contributing
employers in support of their position. In fact, almost any issue important enough to result in deadlock of the trustees could be important
enough to the union and employees to carry the seeds of immediate
or future industrial strife.
Courts should appoint an impartial umpire in every case where
employer and union trustees have reached a deadlock on the administration of the fund, regardless of the issue.60 That is what the wording
of the statute plainly contemplates. Whenever a court takes it upon
itself to determine that an issue is not within the trustees' powers, it
is in effect deciding the merits in favor of the group opposing the
proposal. That is the job of the umpire, not of the court. The urge to
avoid arbitration on the ground that there is nothing to arbitrate
seems to be a vestige of judicial distrust of arbitration. It becomes
clearly inconsistent with national labor policy when trustees' actions
are viewed as part of the bargaining process.
III
THE EXTENT OF FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION OVER TRUST
ADMINISTRATION UNDER SECTION 302(E)

At first glance, it may seem unlikely that subsection (e) of section 302-which gives federal district courts jurisdiction "to restrain
violations" of that section 1-could give rise to any conflict with, or
overlap of, state court jurisdiction. To understand the problem, it is
necessary to bear in mind the peculiar structure of section 302. Although generally looked upon as a measure to regulate employee
benefit funds, it does not affirmatively set forth requirements that
these funds must meet. Instead, it provides a broad prohibition of
60 The processing of these arbitrations would have "therapeutic values." United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
61 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1964). It should be noted that § 302 applies only where the
employees involved are employed in an industry affecting commerce. Sheet Metal Contractors Ass'n v. Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n, 248 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
924 (1958); Pappas v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 125 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. IM. 1954).
Section 302 has no application to funds controlled by the employer. Independent Ass'n of
Mutual Employees v. New York Racing Ass'n, 398 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1968); Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n v. Local 420, Plumbing & Pipe Fitting, 265 F.2d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 1959);
Shapiro v. Rosenbaum, 171 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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all payments by an employer to a "representative of his employees."
But subsection (c) makes the basic prohibition inapplicable to certain
kinds of payments that presumably would otherwise be proscribed.
One exception is for payments to welfare and pension funds with
prescribed structure, benefits, and administration. Thus, under subsection (e) a federal district court could enjoin employer payments to
a welfare or pension fund if it was not operated as a trust, if it provided
benefits not of the type specified, or if it otherwise failed to come
within the exception. 2 No question of state jurisdiction would then
arise.
Subsection (e) has been interpreted as authorizing affirmative
relief to eliminate those offensive features in a welfare or pension
fund's structure or operations that cause it to fail to qualify for the
exception in subsection (c)(5).63 Were this not true, employees would
be deprived of their bargained-for employer contributions merely
because of some shortcoming of the fund or of its administrators.
In cases where affirmative relief is needed to conform the trust
to section 302(c)(5), federal and state jurisdiction may overlap. This
is most apparent when an alleged statutory violation concerns the subsection (c)(5) requirement that the trust be "for the sole and exclusive
benefit of the employees." 64 This phrase happens to parallel the
standard of fiduciary responsibility imposed by the common law of
trusts0 5 Traditionally, supervision of trust administration to enforce
such responsibility has been a function of state courts of equity.66
Thus, irresponsible action by a trustee might be viewed both as a
violation of section 802, enjoinable by a federal district court under
subsection (e), and a common law breach of trust, enjoinable in a state
62 Local 2, Operative Plasterers v. Paramount Plastering, Inc., 810 F.2d 179 (9th

Cir. 1962); Mechanical Contractors Ass'n v. Local 420, Plumbing & Pipe Fitting, 265 F.2d
607 (3d Cir. 1959); Bey v. Muldoon, 217 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
63 Blassie v. Kroger Co., 845 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965); Giordani v. Hoffmann, 295 F.
Supp. 463, 472 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1969); American Bakeries Co. v. Barrick, 162 F. Supp. 882
(N.D. Ohio 1958). See Lewis v. Mill Ridge Coals, Inc., 298 F.2d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 1962),
where the court stated: "The jurisdiction conferred by § 302(e) will permit employment
by the district courts of whatever equitable remedies may be needed to command obedience, by the trustees, to their contractual and statutory obligations." Id. The court also
noted that employees should not be deprived of the benefit of their collectively-bargained

contributions because of the alleged misconduct of the trustees.
64 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1964).
65 REsTATEmENT (S~coND) oF TRusTs §§ 2, 170 (1959).
06 Kroger Co. v. Blassie, 225 F. Supp. 800, 813 (ED. Mo. 1964), modified 6 remanded,
345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965). See generally G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEEs §§ 861-71: (2d
ed. 1962). Where diversity of citizenship can be shown, federal courts have jurisdiction

over a typical beneficiary action for breach of trust without regard to § 302(e). Booth v.
Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 755 (D.N.J. 1957).
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court of equity. The question, therefore, is how far federal courts may
encroach on traditional state court jurisdiction over trust administration under the guise of restraining violations of section 802.
The First Circuit, in Coprav. Suro,67 was the source of speculation
that Congress may have intended to give federal district courts broad
equity jurisdiction to regulate the internal administration of trusts
covered by section 302. The same court recanted in Bowers v. Ulpiano
Casal, Inc.6 8 where it ruled that section 302(e) must be read narrowly
to mean that the only violations that may be enjoined "are violations
of basic structure, as determined by the Congress, not violations of fiduciary obligations or standards of prudence in the administration of the
trust fund."6 9 Consequently, the court found no federal jurisdiction
over the suit for an accounting and repayment of money diverted from
a welfare fund.
The Bowers court labelled the statutory provision that the trust
be for the exclusive benefit of employees as merely a structural requirement. This could make the provision a nullity. If section 302 can
only be violated by a fund's "basic structure" and not by its administration, a fund originally set up as a trust for the benefit of employees
could subsequently be administered for purposes other than their
exclusive benefit without violating section 302. Such a result seems
absurd. The exclusive benefit of employees can be assured only by
proper administration. Structure is just one means to this end, not
the end in itself.
Confusion about this new "structural violation" test is apparent
in the recent case of Giordani v. Hoffmann.70 The district court ac67 236 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1956). The court stated:

The legislative history suggests to some extent that the cases first cited
above are correct and that Congress intended in § 302(e) to create a broad
equity jurisdiction that would not only authorize the district courts to forbid
the making of payments in violation of § 802(a) and (b), but that would also
authorize them to exercise a more general equity power over the welfare funds
whose life in effect depends on the permissive exception of § 302(c)(5). The
way in which § 802 was presented, however, necessarily causes the legislative
history to be lacking in conclusiveness.
Id. at 115. Similar statements can be found in Upholsterers" Union v. Leathercraft Furniture Co., 82 F. Supp. 570, 575 (ED. Pa. 1949), and Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541,

544 (DZ.C. 1948).
893 F.2d 421 (Ist Cir. 1968).
69 Id. at 424. See also Bath v. Pixler, 283 F. Supp. 632 (D. Colo. 1969); Moyer v.
Kirkpatrick, 265 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 387 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1968); Retail
Store Employees Local 692 v. Gordon, 56 L.R.R.M. 2470 (D. Md. 1964); Holton v. McFarland, 215 F. Supp. 372 (D. Alas. 1963); Kane v. Shulton, 189 F. Supp. 882 (D.N.J.
1960); Sanders v. Birthright, 172 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Ind. 1959); Moses v. Ammond, 162
08

F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
70 295 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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cepted jurisdiction under section 302(e) where an allegation of failure
to comply with the statute was based on a pattern of dealing between
the union and the trust. Since the allegation concerned internal
administration of the trust, defendants argued that the issue should
be adjudicated in the state courts. The district court, having accepted
jurisdiction on the basis of what it considered to be structural violations, however, assumed discretionary authority to resolve claims of
breach of fiduciary responsibility. The obvious basis of the court's
action was belief in the existence of concurrent federal-state jurisdiction over trust administration and enforcement of fiduciary responsibility.
The case of Kroger Co. v. Blassie71 took a position between the
Bowers and Giordani extremes. The court there did exercise jurisdiction under section 302(e) to reverse trustee action on certain administrative matters normally within the scope of state court supervision.
The trustee actions affected included location of the trust office in
union headquarters, use of trust funds for non-employee beneficiaries,
and diversion of funds for improper benefit programs. Still, the court
felt compelled to assert that "activities in the day-to-day administration
of the trust" were solely within the jurisdiction of the state courts.72
Thus, it refused to consider such matters as payment of brokerage
commissions to a union trustee, participation of a union trustee in
the purchase for the trust of property owned by himself, and the making of a motion picture about the trust primarily for the union's
benefit. Similarly, in American Bakeries Co. v. Barrick,7 3 the court disapproved location of the fund office in union headquarters, but stated
that the statute did not mean that the court should "take over the
supervision or management of the trust fund.27

4

The views of federal jurisdiction expressed in Bowers, Blassie,
and American Bakeries seem unduly restrictive. Whenever a violation
of section 302 is alleged, a federal district court plainly has jurisdiction
to adjudicate the claim and to grant appropriate relief under sub71

225 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd in part, 345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965).

225 F. Supp. at 313. The district court relied on the dictum in Employing Plas:terers' Ass'n v. Journeymen Local 5, 279 F.2d 92, 97 (7th Cir. 1960), which stated that
the "Act does not create jurisdiction in the federal courts to entertain employees' claims
based solely on the alleged diversion or conversion of their welfare funds."
73 162 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
74 Id. at 883.
It has been pointed out, however, that because of the broad discretion given under
the instrument to trustees of this type of trust they are not as formally supervised by
any court as a testamentary trust docketed in a probate court. Dersch v. UMW Welfare
& Retirement Fund, 73 L.R.R.M. 2409, 2410 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 1969).
72

WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS

section (e). Any improper diversion of trust funds seems properly indudible among such violations-whether in the form of self-dealing
by trustees with trust assets, loans made with inadequate security or
interest to favored borrowers, inflated administrative expenses, or any
other trustee conduct that might similarly constitute a breach of trust.
In such cases, jurisdiction could be based on failure of the trustees to
administer the funds "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees." In addition to restraining the questioned action, effective
remedies might well include an accounting and recovery of funds
diverted. That these remedies are also within the equity powers of a
state court has no bearing on the proper interpretation of section 802.
Thus, whether or not a particular trustee action involves "internal
administration," federal district courts should have jurisdiction to
grant appropriate equitable relief whenever an alleged violation of
section 302 is predicated on the failure of a trustee to act for the exdusive benefit of employees. State court jurisdiction need not be
preempted, but concurrent federal jurisdiction should be recognized.
Such a jurisdictional standard would do no violence to the
statutory language of section 30275 and seems in keeping with its basic
purpose-safeguarding negotiated welfare and pension funds for the
benefit of employees.76 While congressional concern may have been
75 The Supreme Court in Arroyo v. United States, 359 US. 419 (1959), stated:
Continuing compliance with these [statutory] standards in the administration
of welfare funds was made explicitly enforceable in federal district courts by
civil proceedings under § 302(e). The legislative history is devoid of any suggestion that defalcating trustees were to be held accountable under federal law,
except by way of the injunctive remedy provided in that subsection.
rd. at 426-27 (footnote omitted).
76 Senator Ball, who introduced § 302 as an amendment on the Senate floor, stated:
Mr. President, the sole purpose of the amendment is not to prohibit welfare funds, but to make sure that they are legitimate trust funds, used actually
for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who contribute to

them, and that they shall not degenerate into bribes.... I have heard of many
cases in which unions have even relinquished wage demands in order to secure
a welfare fund, with a percentage of the payroll paid into the welfare fund established.. .. [1here is very grave danger that the funds will be used for the
personal gain of union leaders, or for political purposes, or other purposes not
contemplated when they are established ....
2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE IsToRy

THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RLATIONs Acr, 1947, at 1305

(1948). In support of the amendment, Senator Taft stated:
Mhe purpose of the provision is that the welfare fund shall be a perfectly
definite fund, that its purposes shall be stated so that each employee can know
what he is entitled to, can go to court and enforce his rights in the fund, and
that it shall not be, therefore, in the sole discretion of the union or the union
leaders and usable for any purpose which they may think is to the advantage
of the union or the employee ....
...

fiThe tendency is to demand a welfare fund as much in the power of the
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directed primarily at possible diversion to the benefit of unions or
their leaders, diversion to other improper uses would equally deprive
employees of the fruits of their labors, a result which Congress sought
to prevent.
Concurrent federal-state jurisdiction over areas of trust administration governed by section 302 would be in keeping with the resolution of a similar jurisdictional problem in suits for violation of labor
agreements under section 301. 77 If the analogy to contract cases under
section 301 is valid, it follows that federal law would govern any case
arising either in a state or federal court involving a matter of concurrent jurisdiction. 78
The reasons for application of federal law in cases involving collective bargaining agreements under section 301 apply with equal
force to cases involving trusts under section 302. Their outcome should
not depend on the forum chosen since a question of national labor
policy may be involved. The need for national uniformity is evidenced
by the existence of a federal labor statute regulating these trusts and
their operation as an outgrowth and extension of collective bargaining.
Indeed, they may even be considered a part of the collective bargaining agreement. Different state and federal rulings concerning phases
of trust operation covered by section 302 could therefore have - a
disruptive effect on negotiation and administration of collective agreements.
The unique functions of the specialized employee benefit trusts
developed under section 302 also indicate a need for a specialized body
of federal common law of trust administration. For example, questions
about location of the fund office cannot be satisfactorily resolved by
reference to traditional state common law principles designed for inter
vivos and testamentary trusts. While location of jointly-administered
welfare and pension trusts in union headquarters obviously redounds
to the benefit of the union, it may be so advantageous to the trust as
to be desirable in most cases. At the same time, abuses that would
cause such location to defeat the statutory purpose of joint administration should be enjoinable. The federal law emerging on this point
union as possible. Certainly unless we impose some restrictions we shall find that
the welfare fund will become merely a war chest for the particular union ....
Id. at 1311-12.
77 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
78 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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represents a determination of federal labor policy that should uniformly govern any related question in state courts. 79
Clearly, some substantive federal law drawn from the federal
statute must be recognized in any state court action involving section 302 trusts. The supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution
would preclude state court rulings in conflict with express federal
statutory provisions.8 0 But it remains to be seen whether state courts
will concede that federal law must be applied to some aspects of section 302 trust administration. 8 '
IV
THE INTERPLAY OF STATE AND FEDERAI LAw i' ENFORCEMENT
OF WELFARE AND PENSION AGREEMENTS
Problems of federal-state relations are also involved in actions for
enforcement of agreements between unions and employers concerning
welfare and pension plans. A threshold question is whether they are
suits within the scope of section 301.2 The answer determines
whether jurisdiction lies with the federal or state courts, or both, and
88
whether federal or state law applies.
Where the welfare or pension plan is a jointly-administered
Taft-Hartley trust of the type covered by section 302(c)(5), the collective bargaining agreement usually provides only for specified employer contributions to a fund. This obligation under the collective
719 Kroger Co. v. Blassie, 225 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Mo. 1964), modified & remanded,
345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965); Ware v. Adams, 53 L.R.R.M. 2290 (S.D. Cal. 1963); American
Bakeries Co. v. Barrick, 162 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
80 U.S. CONST. art. VI. An example of such a conflict might be an attempt under
state insurance law to prevent "self-insurance" or direct payment of benefits, both of
which § 302 expressly permits. See Goetz, Regulation of Uninsured Employee Welfare
Plans Under State Insurance Laws, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 319, 329-34.
81 The California Supreme Court in Cox v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 855, 346 P.2d
15 (1959), recognized the existence of this problem, but found it unnecessary to determine
what law should be applied. The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently believes that state
law governs. St. Paul Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v. Cartier, 283 Minn. 212, 215-16, 167
N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (1969).
82 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter [id. § 152(6)], or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties ....

Id. § 185(a).

83 The problem is complicated by the layers of documentation of welfare and pen-
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bargaining agreement is enforceable by the union as promisee,"4 but
it is usually enforced by trustees of the fund as third party beneficiaries.8 5 When an industry affecting commerce is involved, action to
enforce such obligations is within the ambit of section 3016 and
therefore may be brought either in federal or state courts. 8 7
As in other actions under section 301, whether in federal or state
courts, federal common law of collective bargaining agreements is
applicable. 8 This is desirable since the obligation to contribute to a
jointly-administered welfare or pension fund has unusual characteristics calling for development of federal law that may differ from state
common law of contracts.
A leading case in this development is Lewis v. Benedict Coal
Corp.,8 9 a suit by welfare fund trustees against an employer for contributions due under a collective bargaining agreement. A general
rule of contract law is that a promisor may raise against a third party
beneficiary the same defenses he could raise against the promisee. 0
Nevertheless, the defendant employer in this case was not allowed to
set-off its damages resulting from the union's breach of the agreement
against the claim of the trustees. The Supreme Court noted that a
collective bargaining agreement is not a typical third party beneficiary
contract, particularly where contributions to a jointly-administered
sion plans. Customarily, detailed eligibility requirements and benefit formulas are not
set forth in the basic collective bargaining agreement covering wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment. These details may be found in some other document collateral to the basic agreement.
84 Local 445, Teamsters v. Crozier Bros., 68 L.R.R.M. 2510 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Local 90,
Stove Mounters' v. Welbilt Corp., 178 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Mich. 1959); United Constr.
Workers v. Electro Chem. Engraving Co., 175 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Local 401,
Teamsters v. Alto Trucking Co., 68 L.R.R.M. 2446 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1967).
85 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 861 U.S. 459 (1960); Trustees v. Wachsberger
Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, 66 L.R.R.M. 2047 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Hann v. Korum, 64
L.R.R.M. 2862 (D. Ore. 1967); Sabella v. Litchfield, - Cal. App. 2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 845
(1969); see Lewis v. Lowry, 295 F.2d 197, 199 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 977
(1962); Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp., 243 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1957).
86 Schlecht v. Hiatt, 271 F. Supp. 644, 648 (D. Ore. 1967), rev'd, 400 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.
1968) (employers not engaged in interstate commerce); Hann v. Harlow, 271 F. Supp.
674 (D. Ore. 1967); Harm v. Korum, 64 L.R.R.M. 2862 (D. Ore. 1967); Thomas v. Reading
Anthracite Co., 264 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
87 See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 868 U.S. 502 (1962). For examples
of suits for enforcement of employer contributions brought in federal and state courts,
see cases cited in notes 84-85 supra.
88 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 868 U.S. 502 (1962); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957);
see Nedd v. UMW, 400 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1968).
89 861 U.S. 459 (1960).
90 4 A. COPBiN, Co-r.Acrs §§ 818-19 (1951); RFSTATmENT oF CoNmTAcrs § 140 (1933).
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employee benefit fund are involved. The agreements are usually
industry-wide; thus, if one employer were permitted to set-off damages
for union breaches against its liability for contributions, the burden
would fall in the first instance on employees and their families, and
ultimately on other employers. Furthermore, such payments are tantamount to wages, which cannot be decreased because of claims the
employer may have against the union. Thus, deviation from state contract law has dearly been authorized in suits under section 301 for
collection of employer contributions to jointly-administered funds.
The recognized importance of contributions to these funds might
justify punitive damage awards in trustee collection suits. Although
not generally allowed in contract actions,9 1 punitive damages have
been held to be an appropriate remedy in at least one suit under section 301. In Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753,92
the court stressed the need for an effective deterrent to the type of
conduct involved there-breach of a no-strike clause. An effective
deterrent is equally needed in contribution collection cases where it
can be shown that the breach is deliberate and, particularly, where it
is repeated. Such a deterrent would carry out federal labor policy by
protecting the interest of employee~beneficiaries in sound funds and
by minimizing the possibility of strikes to enforce employer obligations
to contribute. Punitive damage awards would also support the public
policy of states that make willful nonpayment of contributions to
93
welfare and pension funds a criminal offense.
The award of reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the damages
collected by trustees of jointly-administered funds in an action against
employers would be an appropriate deterrent to willful contribution
delinquencies. Otherwise, employers owing small amounts to the
trust might be tempted to ignore the obligation knowing that suit
to collect would be a losing proposition for the trustees. Even when
the breach is not willful, such an award could be justified if there
were an express provision for recovery of collection costs in the collective bargaining agreement or trust agreement. 94
Although not usually a part of the damages for breach of con91 5 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACtS § 1077 (1964); REsTATEENT oF CoNmRAcrs § 342 (1933);
Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIo ST. LJ. 284 (1959); Annot.,
84 A.L.R. 134 (1933).
92 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. IMI. 1966). Contra, Local 127, United Shoe Workers v.
Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962); Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 291 F. Supp. 908 (D. Colo. 1968).
93 See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 227 (West 1955), as amended, (West Supp. 1968).
94 S. W LWS-ON, CONTRACTS § 786 (3d ed. 1961).
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tract,95 recovery of counsel fees has been permitted by the Supreme
9 6 That case involved a suit for welfare
Court in Sherman v. Carter.
fund contributions against the surety under a Miller Act payment
bond, but the award was based on the right to recover counsel fees as
damages under the agreement between the contractor and the union.
Consequently, it seems appropriate to consider the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the federal common law applicable in
contribution collection cases involving trusts under section 302.
Another developing aspect of federal common law concerns oral
modification of written agreements to contribute to Taft-Hartley
trusts. In several suits for employer contributions by trustees of the
Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund, employers have defended on the basis of oral agreements with union representatives that
contributions specified in the written collective bargaining agreement
need not be made. Under general rules of contract law, such oral
agreements would be given effect, notwithstanding the parol evidence
rule.9 7 Accordingly, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have refused to exclude evidence of oral modification to written contribution
agreements. 98 In each case, however, dissenting or concurring judges
favored establishment of a federal common law rule that employer
contribution agreements cannot be modified or nullified by secret
side agreements when a Taft-Hartley trust is involved.
This approach to the problem of oral modification of employer
contribution agreements was taken by the Third Circuit in Lewis v.
Seanor Coal Co.99 The court there held that an oral agreement by
union representatives to suspend contributions required by an existing written collective bargaining agreement was not a defense to a
trustee suit for employer contributions. The court reasoned that such
oral modification would violate section 302(c)(5). 100 The section reCORBIN, CoNTAcrs § 1037 (1964).
96 353 U.S. 210 (1957).
97 Generally, evidence of antecedent oral understandings is not admissible for the
purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of a completely integrated written agreement. 3 A. CoRmIN, CoNmACTs § 573 (1960); RSTATEMNT OF CONTRaCS § 237 (1933). An
exception, however, permits extrinsic evidence to show that an existing document was
not executed as a contract or as an integrated agreement. A. CORBIN, supra §§ 577, 582.
Evidence of subsequent oral agreement is also admissible to modify a prior written
integration. Id. § 574.
98 Lewis v. Owens, 338 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1964); Lewis v. Mears, 297 F.2d 101 (Sd
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 US. 873 (1962); Lewis v. Lowry, 295 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1961);
cf. Lewis v. Coleman, 257 F. Supp. 38 ($.D.W. Va. 1966).
99 382 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 US. 947 (1968).
100 It is difficult to understand why other courts have paid so little heed to the
mandate of the Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills to fashion a body of federal common law

95 5 A.
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quires that "the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made
[be] specified in a written agreement with the employer."' 0' This
phrase has been interpreted to cover employer payments to the trust
fund.10 2 Consequently, an oral agreement varying the terms of a written agreement concerning contributions to such a fund should be
ignored as a matter of federal labor policy on the ground that it does
not comply with the federal statute.
This principle, applied by the Third Circuit with respect to oral
agreement subsequent to the written agreement, seems equally applicable to oral agreements prior to or contemporaneous with the
written agreement. Any other result would defeat the purpose of
section 302(c)(5), which was to give employees the right to know exactly
18
what they were receiving for their services.
Applicability of federal common law based on national labor
policy also comes into question when employees or unions sue to enforce
rights to benefits under negotiated welfare and pension plans. Where
the asserted right arises out of a jointly-administered employee benefit
trust, the action might be viewed as a suit in equity to enforce the
terms of a trust, rather than a suit under section 301 for violation of
a contract between an employer and a labor organization. At least
one federal district court has taken this view and based its jurisdiction
on diversity of citizenship.10 4 A number of other federal courts have
accepted jurisdiction over suits by employees to enforce rights under
such jointly-administered trusts without discussing section 301 or any
other basis for their jurisdiction. 0 5 Presumably, it was based on
diversity of citizenship or on some factor unrelated to the Labor-Management Relations Act.
On the other hand, one federal district court, in Abruscato v. Industrial Workers,0 6 recently held that a suit by an employee to enforce
for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. See cases cited in note 98 supra. In
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960), this mandate was clearly made ap.
plicable to trustee suits for collection of contributions to welfare and pension funds.
101 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1964).
102 Moglia v. Geoghegan, 403 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 919
(1969); Lewis v. Seanor Coal Co., 882 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947
(1968); Employing Plasterers' Ass'n v. Journeymen Local 5, 46 L.R.R.M. 2692 (N.D. Ill.
1960); cf. Ramsey v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund, 281 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Tenn.
1964); Win. Dunbar Co. v. Painters Dist. Council 51, 129 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1955). But
cf. Bey v. Muldoon, 223 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
103 See note 76 supra.
104 Dersch v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund, 73 L.R.R.M. 2409 (S.D. Ind. Nov.'

20, 1969).
105 See cases cited in notes 107-108 infra.
106 69 L.R.R.M. 2537 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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rights under a jointly-administered trust could properly be brought
under section 301. The court reasoned that the collective bargaining
agreement, providing for employer contributions to the trust, in
effect incorporated the trust agreement and made a violation of the
trust agreement a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. It
may have been significant that the union and certain employers, as
well as the trustees, were defendants.
In a series of cases involving the Mine Workers Fund, federal
courts have developed a standard for review of the broad discretion
given trustees of welfare and pension funds over questions of coverage
and eligibility of employees. The standard is that "the trustees' decisions are subject to judicial correction only in cases where it can
be shown that they have acted arbitrarily and capriciously towards
those to whom their trust obligations run.' 0 When a prima facie
showing of unreasonable action is made, the trustees have the burden
of showing "some rational nexus" between the fund's purpose and
the action taken. 08
In view of the tailoring of this standard for Taft-Hartley trusts,
under which trustees have special discretion, it probably can be considered part of federal common law applicable to the trusts. If suits
against trustees to enforce employee rights are indeed suits under
section 301, as the Abruscato case would indicate, then this standard
ought to be applied in similar actions in state courts. Nevertheless, a
recent Washington state court decision, overturning a pension benefit
determination by the trustees of a jointly-administered fund, treated
the case as a contract action without any mention of possible application of section 301 or federal law. 10 9
A different problem is presented by cases concerning rights to
benefits under negotiated welfare and pension plans not jointly-administered by union and employer trustees and not covered by
section 302. Instead of reviewing the reasonableness of trustee exercise
107 Gomez v. Lewis, 414 F.2d 1312, 1314 (3d Cir. 1969). See also Kosty v. Lewis, 319
F.2d 744, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964); Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d
345 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Pavlovscak v. Lewis, 190 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 295 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1961). The same principle applied to exercise of discretion
by a joint board of administration under a plan not covered by § 302. Borg v. Wojcik,
70 L.R.R.M. 3093 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
108 Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
109 Dorward v. LLWU-PMA Pension Plan, 75 Wash. 2d 492, 452 P.2d 258 (1969). In
Beaty v. Maritime Ass'ns, 442 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969), a claim for pension
benefits under a jointly-administered fund was treated as a contract action by the state
court without any mention of federal law. In Branch v. White, 99 NJ. Super. 295, 239
A.2d 665 (1968), the court held that § 302 did not give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over suits to enforce rights under jointly-administered trusts and proceeded to decide the merits without consideration of federal law.
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of broad discretion, the court in such cases must make its own interpretation or application of a provision in the governing plan.
If the contract contains a disputes procedure, the complaining
employee or union, of course, must show either that it has been exhausted or that it would be impractical or futile to do so.11 0 When
such a showing has been made, the question facing a court is whether
section 301 applies to the particular legal document on which the
claim is based. In cases where that document is the collective bargaining agreement itself, or a related insurance or pension agreement between the employer and the union, section 301 dearly applies,111 as
112
does the federal substantive law of collective bargaining.
A claim to benefits, however, sometimes must be based on a
separate group insurance policy, pension plan, or trust agreement to
which the union is not a party. When the underlying collective
bargaining agreement makes some reference to the separate plan, a
claim based on that plan may still be considered a suit for violation of
a contract between an employer and a labor organization covered by
section 301.113 It is not necessary that the plan actually be iricorporated
by reference or physically attached to the collective bargaining agreement; provision that the plan will not be changed during the term
14
of the agreement is sufficient.1
The Fifth Circuit, in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v.
5 has stated that "[i]t may be that the scope of § 301 is sufCraton,"r
ficiently broad to include within its coverage the declaration of rights
under insurance policies which arise out of the collective bargaining
process."'1 16 On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit, in Hudson v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 117 held that disposition of certain
forfeited surrender values must be determined under the terms of
the applicable annuity contract without regard to national labor
110 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650
(1965); Hauser v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 299 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn. 1969); cf.
Rakness v. Swift & Co., 275 Minn. 451, 147 N.W.2d 567 (1966).
The right to arbitrate a claim to vested benefits may survive expiration of the
agreement. United Rubber Workers v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 394 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); United Steelworkers v. H.K. Porter Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2201
(W.D. Pa. 1966).
111 Upholsterers' Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1967).
112 Borg v. Wojcik, 70 L.R.R.M. 3093 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
113 UAW v. Textron, Inc., 312 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1963); American Fed'n of Labor v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1950).
114 American Fed'n of Labor v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir.

1950).
115 405 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968).
116 Id. at 48.
117 $14 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1963).
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policy. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the union
was not a party to the annuity contract, that the collective bargaining
agreement made no reference to the contract, and that the annuity
118
plan had been discussed only very indirectly in negotiations.
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that suits based on rights
under an insurance policy, pension plan, or trust agreement referred
to in a labor agreement, or designed to implement an agreement
reached through bargaining, should come within the ambit of section
301. In the rare case where a union could have demanded bargaining
about a plan but did not, application of section 301 and federal labor
law may not be warranted. Even in cases where plan benefits have
never been negotiated, however, the plan might still be considered an
implied term of a contract between an employer and a labor organization so that a suit for benefits could be considered under section 301.
Federal labor law has generally been ignored in state court
actions to enforce employee claims to negotiated plan benefits. 119 Just
how considerations of national labor policy might require deviation
from established state insurance, contract, or trust law in determining
employee rights to benefits is difficult to foretell. Some deviation
appears inevitable as a steadily increasing volume of litigation
dramatizes the labor relations aspects of these plans that distinguish
them from garden-variety, master-servant problems under the common
law. A problem area likely to receive special treatment concerns employee rights and employer duties under negotiated welfare and pension plans after plant shutdown and plan termination.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The duty of fair representation probably has been extended to
retired former employees by the NLRB holding that unions have a
statutory right to bargain about benefit adjustments for retirees. This
may present some difficult practical problems for unions attempting to
resolve competing interests of active employees and retirees in the
limited amounts available for economic settlements negotiated with
employers. Unions are also exposed to potential liability in negotiating
the final distribution of pension funds in connection with plan
terminations, particularly where "vested rights" of employees may be
involved. If employee rights are truly vested, an agreement to modify
118 Id. at 23-24.
119 Sbrogna v. Worcester Stamped Metal Co., 354 Mass. 17, 284 NX.E2d 749 (1968);
Harrison v. Lakey Foundry Corp., 72 L.R.R.M. 2186 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969); Rakness v.
Swift & Co., 275 Minn. 451, 147 N.W.2d 567 (1966); Reilly v. Walker Bros., 425 Pa. I,

229 A.2d 457 (1967).
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such rights may be ineffective, but this should not result in liability
to a union that has acted in good faith without hostile discrimination.
The conduct of employer and union trustees under jointly-administered plans, though primarily fiduciary in nature, has overtones
.of collective bargaining. This should make the Steelworker Trilogy
rules on arbitrability applicable to petitions for appointment of
impartial umpires to break trustee deadlocks. There is also a possibility
that unions may be held responsible under their duty of fair representation for any hostile discrimination against employees by union-appointed trustees.
Federal courts continue to show reluctance to accept jurisdiction
under section 302(e) over internal administration of jointly-administered trusts. Nevertheless, there seems to be an adequate basis for
such jurisdiction whenever it is alleged that the trust is not being
administered for the exclusive benefit of employees. Such cases may
call for application of a developing federal common law of trust
administration.
Suits to enforce employer obligations to contribute to jointlyadministered funds are covered by section 301 and require application
of federal common law. This has led to the conclusion that employer
defenses available against the promisee-union are not available against
the trustees, and to the award of attorneys fees as part of damages.
Special rules seem to be developing to prevent oral modification of
written agreements to contribute, and may also be appropriate for
the award of punitive damages.
In suits to enforce employee rights to benefits based on documents
separate from the collective bargaining agreement-insurance policies,
pension plans, and trust agreements-applicability of section 301 and
other federal labor law is still in doubt. It probably should be applied whenever the document is referred to in a collective bargaining
agreement, or is used to implement benefits called for by a collective
bargaining agreement.
Federal labor law and federal courts are beginning to play an
expanded role in enforcement and administration of negotiated welfare
and pension plans. This expansion seems likely to continue as courts
become more aware of the close relationship of these plans to collective
bargaining and national labor policy.*
Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Sixth Circuit has refused to enforce the NLRB's Pittsburgh Plate Glass decision. 74 L.R.R.M. 2425 (6th Cir. June 10,

1970); see discussion pp. 912-14 supra. The court found retired employees to be neither
"employees" nor within the "bargaining unit" for purposes of § 8(a)(5). Supreme Court
review is likely.

